On June 12th 2010 the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) opened its doors to India, offering the country permanent membership into one of the world�€™s newest strategic blocs. India, after enjoying observer status at the SCO for years, is now eligible for a seat at the table with some of the most powerful countries in the eastern hemisphere. This opportunity could propel Asia�€™s crouching tiger into a position of considerable influence but it would also force it out of an age-old, tried and tested policy of non-alignment. 

The role and objective of the SCO has been described as ambiguous by some and comprehensive by others. Formed in 1996, under a treaty that deepened military trust in border regions around Shanghai, the SCO consisted of five countries namely Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and the People�€™s Republic of China. Later in 2001, the strategic bloc admitted Uzbekistan into its fold. The SCO has dawned many faces since then, as an economic cooperative, a military and security alliance, a partnership for energy and resource stability as well as a counter measure to Western strategic blocs like the Northern Alliance Treaty Organization (NATO), and though it is still rather inchoate in character the SCO has the potential to form one of the first and most dynamic networks for emerging nations in Asia.  

India has formally expressed its keen interest in joining the group and membership would definitely proffer certain opportunities in the future. It would allow India a comfortable space where it can share its ideas and viewpoints about Afghanistan with other neighboring countries at a time when Pakistan is becoming increasingly central to the Afghan-Taliban problem. Pakistan has raised objections to Indian involvement in Afghanistan on many occasions, evidenced most recently by Turkey�€™s admission in Wikileaks documents, and admittance into the SCO would allow India to avoid the risk of diplomatic isolation. 

Strong partnerships with SCO countries might offer India a little more credence while dealing with other international bodies like the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and even the Organization for Islamic Conference (OIC). It will also bring India much closer to Russia and China, two of the four current members on the United Nations Security Council. 

Another obvious advantage for India will be access to energy markets in Central Asia and Russia. In the short-run, it is easier for India to get its petroleum products from the Middle East and Indonesia via sea rather than from Central Asian countries via land routes because of the unstable political and security barriers that it faces with neighboring countries Pakistan and Afghanistan.  However in the long-run, with its primary energy demand set to double by 2025, India will want to expand and secure energy resources within the region. 

This is perhaps one of the reasons why the SCO�€™s umbrella framework of tackling security concerns and resource challenges together is so apt for the region and consequently for India. In recent years security in Afghanistan has become a central issue in the SCO. The organization has also proven to be quite prescient in terrorism-related matters; it signed a convention on the Fight against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism in June 2001, exactly three months before 9/11. Other more far reaching goals of the SCO that India could benefit from include the creation of a Eurasian Economic Community, with free trade to improve the flow of goods in the region and a banking system that is independent from the volatility of the international banking systems.  

Yet despite these advantages, membership into this alliance of the east does not come without certain drawbacks. It might make India more vulnerable to international intervention on the Kashmir issue, a dispute that has historically avoided third party involvement. It could jeopardize improved relations with USA and other Western countries like France and Germany at a time when Pakistan is trying to strengthen cooperation with NATO forces in its border areas and win American favor for its nuclear program. Lastly, India will have to swallow a bitter pill and force cooperation with Pakistan despite pending disagreements as the SCO has already made it clear that it will only offer joint membership to the two nuclear nations. 

India does however enjoy an upper hand. Several member countries, especially Russia, have voiced their support for India. Its military might, large population and future energy demand make it a desirable option for the organization and its recently expressed keenness to be involved is no doubt a refreshing change for the SCO members. Pakistan on the other hand has sold its experience with terrorism and its location as an energy corridor as its strong-points and while the former is undeniably true the latter is of no consequence unless Pakistan can stabilize its internal situation. 

With the addition of India, the SCO would include close to half the entire human population and more than 70% of the land mass in Eurasia; a largely representative body of the new and developing world. It would address the three primary concerns for the future, namely, energy and resources, security and terrorism and economic stability. And although there are certain reservations that India might hold towards a policy of alignment the returns for cooperation with SCO countries far outweigh the shortcomings.