Doha - In the Middle East, crisis and opportunity are often two sides of the same coin. Today, the question has fast become, “are we heading towards war or peace?” If we are to give peace a chance, the current “band-aid” diplomacy to deal with intractable, simmering and connected conflicts needs more imaginative solutions. In particular, the status quo option has become untenable as two trains – Iran’s right to nuclear technology and Israel’s existential fears of a nuclear armed Iran – head towards each other with increasing speed. We urgently need a realistic and effective diplomatic strategy that can deliver a “new strategic vision” - a comprehensive settlement based on cooperative alliances and common values in the region.
Any new diplomatic efforts must be sensitive to a changed Middle East. The balance of power in the region has markedly shifted over the past decade. US power, especially military, has been shown to have its limits – its reputation of providing principled and effective leadership has suffered while Iranian and, to a lesser extent, Syrian goals and ambitions have been ascending. The situation in Iraq or the “stop-go” developments in Lebanon or in Palestine have illustrated these countries’ influence. American allies in the region, desperate for stability and sensitive to the wishes of their own people, are also increasingly acting independently. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Gulf where the states of a confident “new Middle East,” riding high even in the midst of the current global downturn and flush with oil revenues, have developed their own strategies to deal with the problems of the “historic Middle East.” Israel’s army, post summer 2006, has been shown to be vulnerable to the asymmetrical warfare of Hezbollah, Hamas and other groups in the region, not least Al-Qaeda. Then there are the greater perceived fears of a nuclear weapons armed Iran.
There is perhaps a more hopeful scenario, especially if interests converge. Talking for now seems to have replaced fighting as all actors – state and non-state – see the limits of military force. Israel and the Palestinians have continued to talk seriously even if an agreement is still some way away; and Israel and Syria continue to talk, albeit through Turkey. The Syrian and Lebanese Presidents have also agreed to exchange diplomatic missions and perhaps embark on a new more cooperative chapter between the two countries than the recent past. The earlier Doha Agreement has ensured a National Unity Government in Lebanon and a path to the next parliamentary elections in the spring of 2009. Most importantly, Bill Burns, one of the US’s most respected diplomats, joined in July his “P5+1” colleagues for “talks before talks” with Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. Post Geneva, however, the bottom line for the US, Israel and Britain and its European partners remains the same: “no unchecked Iranian uranium enrichment or else.” Iran and the most powerful man in the country, its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khameini, do not seem to be budging.
Existing international mechanisms are not sufficient to keep pace with events on the ground. Any recent positive developments will not hold for long unless we ensure that future diplomatic efforts are imaginative and innovative. The Annapolis process, if serious at all, is surely going nowhere with the internal political turmoil in Israel and the continuing warfare between Hamas and Fatah in the West Bank and Gaza. The singular focus of the “P5+1” mechanism on the Iranian nuclear issue is not broad enough to deliver comprehensive peace. Furthermore, continued Iranian uranium enrichment is having a destabilizing effect on the region and could lead to a regional arms race that endangers the already fragile nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The Middle East Quartet’s efforts at supporting Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts have been too ineffective for too long. Moreover, these mechanisms do not include other Arab or Muslim countries such as the UAE, Qatar and Turkey, which have demonstrated their ability to help bridge important differences. Emerging energy-hungry powers such as China and India also need to be bought into the tent.
An international conference along the lines of the Madrid Conference in 1991 could provide the stage for universal recognition of such a vision for the region. The conference would, as in the period after the first Gulf War, have to be carefully prepared by determined US-led diplomacy in consultation with the other big powers, particularly Europe and Russia and the states of the region. The process of preparation should build confidence, provide a framework for wide-ranging talks, and offer essential ladders from which certain parties could climb down. Furthermore, such a conference should boost not hinder efforts on specific peace tracks, rather like the Madrid conference helped build confidence for the secret Oslo talks. Unlike Madrid, however, this conference need not be a one-time event but rather develop into a semi-permanent venue for talking and building trust amongst suspicious actors.
Nobody wants war, but history as well as the recent past, tell us that in the absence of such diplomacy, it may be easier to go to war in this blighted region than make peace.
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