One of the longest and bloodiest intrastate conflicts in contemporary history is the secessionist rebellion in the Indonesian province of Aceh. It began on 4 December 1976 when Muhammad Hassan di Tiro declared Acehnese independence. Hostilities soon flared up between the rebels, who styled themselves the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), and government forces.
By 1983 the GAM forces had been defeated in the field and di Tiro had fled to exile in Sweden from where he continued to direct the rebellion. The GAM recuperated and in 1989 challenged the Government once more. By 1992 the Government again had the situation under control through repressive methods characterized by human rights violations.
In May 2000, as Indonesia was undergoing democratic reform, the Government of President Abdurrahman Wahid opened up negotiations with the GAM with the mediation of the Henri Dunant Centre, an international humanitarian NGO. This resulted in the signing in Geneva of a document called “Joint Understanding for Humanitarian Pause for Aceh,” which was essentially a confidence building measure that would allow the free flow of humanitarian aid to Aceh.
By January 2001 both sides reached a “Provisional Understanding” on a formula that would transform the GAM from an armed rebellion to a political movement—but dialogue could not proceed any further because there were too many skirmishes taking place between the GAM and government forces on the ground.
In February 2002, negotiations resumed between the Government, now under the administration of President Megawati Soekarnoputri, and the GAM, again with the Henri Dunant Centre mediating. In these negotiations, this writer served as chief government negotiator.
As in previous negotiations, the non-negotiable Government’s position as the starting point of discussion was the law granting special autonomy to the province within the framework of the unitary Republic of Indonesia—the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam law. The GAM found this difficult to accept because it would have meant their abandonment of their quest for independence. So, in spite of a signed and positively worded joint statement issued on 10 May 2002, negotiations floundered and broke down.
Talks resumed in September and a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) was signed between the Government and the GAM in Geneva on 9 December 2002. The cessation of hostilities was meant to lead to an all-inclusive Aceh dialogue during which they would negotiate on the modality for the review and possible revision of the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) Law. But almost immediately, the cease-fire was broken, the Thai and Filipino monitors of the ceasefire were taken off the field for their safety, and the implementation of the agreement unraveled.
Trying to save the situation, the Government called for a meeting of the highest authority in the implementation of the agreement, the Joint Council, but the GAM first refused to attend the meeting and later agreed to meet in Tokyo in May 2003. However, the meeting broke down almost from the very beginning. Losing patience, the Government declared martial law in Aceh and launched in mid-May 2003 an integrated operation that included the delivery of humanitarian aid and the restoration of the capacity of local governments to rule, but with a military offensive as its main component.
Initially expected to last six months, the military operation had been ongoing for over a year and a half, giving no respite to a war-weary Acehnese people, when an earthquake and tsunami devastated many places on the Indian Ocean rim, including Aceh where some 130,000 died and half a million were rendered homeless.
With the whole of Aceh, including the GAM, totally crushed by the catastrophe, and with the Government wishing to focus on a massive rebuilding effort in the province without also having to deal with a separatist rebellion, negotiations resumed in early 2005. This time Vice President Yusuf Kalla led the government side. Another non-governmental organization, the Helsinki-based Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), served as facilitator. The venue of negotiations was Helsinki, Finland.
After about five months of talks, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in August 2005, which called for the quick disarmament of the GAM, the reduction of military and police presence in Aceh and self-government for Aceh on the basis of new legislation that would be passed no later than March 2006. An international team composed of officials contributed by the European Union and ASEAN would monitor the implementation of the MoU.
The devil, of course, was in the details. And while all of Indonesia rejoiced because an agreement that could lead to peace had been reached, there were misgivings on whether there were enough safeguards in the MoU against a future Acehnese government breaking away, ironically on the basis of ambiguities in the wording of the MoU.
But today, ten months later, peace in Aceh has been holding and both sides have been meeting their commitments to the agreement. Legislation on Aceh governance did not meet the end of March 2006 deadline but at this writing it is still seriously debated but showing considerable progress.
The proposed law would give Aceh greater autonomy not only in managing its own affairs but also in the use of its abundant natural resources. It would also provide for a special autonomy fund of two percent of the national budget for a 20-year period starting 2007. It would authorize the setting up of a Human Rights Tribunal and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Moreover, it would allow the formation of local parties with 30 percent subscription from women, and independent candidates to contest provincial elections later this year.
At this stage, with the debate in Parliament still on-going, unpleasant surprises cannot yet be ruled out. Ideally speaking it would be best if the law on governing Aceh can be adopted by acclamation. But if this is not possible the Government controls enough votes to have the bill passed in a form that would be basically acceptable to all concerned. So the overall outlook for peace in Aceh appears bright. If Parliament produces a law on Aceh governance that is widely accepted and democratic provincial elections are successfully held this year, and the Acehnese people begin enjoying the socioeconomic dividends of peace, there is a good chance that the decades-long problem of Aceh will be resolved for good. The international community can play a crucial role in producing these peace dividends that in turn will strengthen the peace process.
-By Ambassador Sastrohandoyo Wiryono |
